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DEFERENCE TO STATE COURTS IN THE ADJUDICATION
OF RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
By CHARLES M. ELLIOTT* and KENNETH BALCOMB**
INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the jurisdiction of a federal court to determine the
United States' claims to reserved water rights, including claims
asserted on behalf of Indian tribes, should yield to the adjudica-
tory process of a Colorado water court.' Akin v. United States
culminated nearly a decade of litigation as to the proper forum
for the adjudication of reserved right claims. This decision pre-
serves the efficacy of the Colorado water adjudicatory system
and confirms the salutary purpose of the McCarran Amendment.'
* Associate, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado; Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Colorado, 1974-76; A.B., 1971, Duke University; J.D., 1973, University of Denver.
** Partner, Delaney & Balcomb, Glenwood Springs, Colorado; LL.B., 1948, Univer-
sity of Colorado.
Both authors express their appreciation to Robert L. McCarty, McCarty & Noone,
Washington, D.C., and David W. Robbins, First Assistant Attorney General, State of
Colorado, who, along with the authors, were attorneys on the case, for their comments.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (this
case is more commonly known by the name of its companion case, Akin v. United States)
[hereinafter cited as Akin]. Although the federal claims were filed in a'single action, two
separate petitions for writ of certiorari were eventually filed. Both were granted and the
cases were consolidated for hearing. 421 U.S. 946 (1975).
2 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970), commonly known as the "McCarran Amendment," author-
izes the joinder of the United States in certain adjudications of water rights. In full text,
it provides:
(a) Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant
in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it
appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring
water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange,
or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The
United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have
waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the
United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2)
shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having
jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances: Provided,
That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any
such suit.
(b) Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon
the Attorney General or his designated representative.
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Although the doctrine of abstention was expressly circumscribed
and held inapplicable, deference to the state water court was
nevertheless found to be proper upon considerations of "wise judi-
cial administration. ' ' 3 Significantly, the claims asserted by the
United States on behalf of two Indian tribes were found to be no
basis for denying the power to adjudicate federal reserved water
rights to the Colorado court.
I. THE IMPLIED RESERVATION DOCTRINE
The doctrine of implied reservation of water rights4 was re-
cently outlined by the Supreme Court in Cappaert v. United
States:5
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government
withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a
federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appur-
tenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accom-
plish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States
acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the
date of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appro-
priators. Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Commerce
Clause, Art. I, § 8, which permits federal regulation of navigable
streams, and the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, which permits fed-
eral regulation of federal lands. The doctrine applies to Indian reser-
vations and other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in
navigable and nonnavigable streams.'
(c) Nothing in the Act shall be construed as authorizing the joinder of
the United States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the
United States involving the right of States to the use of the water of any
interstate stream.
The genesis of this limited waiver of sovereign immunity was first proposed by Senator
McCarran of Arizona in 1949. After considerable attention by the legislative and executive
branches of government, the "McCarran Amendment" was passed by Congress on July
4, 1952, as a rider to the Department of Justice Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1953. It
was signed by President Truman on July 10, 1952. See generally Comment, Adjudication
of Water Rights Claimed By the United States-Application of Common-Law Remedies
and the McCarran Amendment of 1952, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 94 (1960); Comment, The
McCarran Amendment-A Method of Clarifying the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 7
LAND & WATER L. REv. 587 (1972); Comment, Adjudication of Federal Reserved Water
Rights, 42 U. CoLo. L. REv. 161 (1970).
424 U.S. at 817.
It is also frequently referred to as the reserved rights doctrine or the Winters doc-
trine. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
5 96 S. Ct. 2062 (1976).
1 Id. at 2069 (citations omitted). In Cappaert, the Court considered a Government
claim to reserved waters appurtenant to Devil's Hole, which was established in 1952 as a
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The Supreme Court first applied the doctrine of reserved
rights in Winters v. United States7 in regard to the Fort Belknap
Indian Reservation in Montana. For several decades after
Winters, it was a generally accepted notion that the judicially
created doctrine was "a special rule of Indian law." 8 With only
this limited exception, the states, not the Federal Government,
were believed to be the source of all rights to the use of water
within their boundaries.
detached unit of the Death Valley National Monument. Devil's Hole is a limestone cavern
which contains a pool inhabited by a unique species of fish, commonly known as Devil's
Hole pupfish, which were isolated from their ancestral stock when the prehistoric Death
Valley Lake System dried up. For survival, the pupfish depend upon a partially sub-
merged rock shelf. The water in the pool, which covers the rock shelf, comes from a huge
aquifer which extends beneath approximately 4,500 square miles of land.
Acting pursuant to state law, the Cappaerts pumped groundwater from wells about
two and one-half miles from Devil's Hole for use on their ranch. During periods of their
pumping, the water level in Devil's Hole dropped, exposing a greater area of the rock shelf
and endangering the continued survival of the pupfish.
The Court avoided extending the doctrine of reserved rights to groundwater by finding
that the pool was surface water. Id. at 2071. There was, however, no hesitation in declaring
that reserved rights can be protected "whether the diversion is of surface or groundwater."
Id. at 2072. The Court upheld an injunction which required the Cappaerts to limit their
pumping so that a certain water level, necessary to preserve the pupfish, is maintained
in the pool. See generally Note, Federally Reserved Rights to Underground Water-A
Rising Question in the Arid West, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 43.
7 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Although the 1888 treaty which established the Indian reserva-
tion was silent as to water rights, the Court said:
The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from
appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be. The
United States v. The Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co. 174 U.S. 690, 702; United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371. That the Government did reserve them we
have decided, and for a use which would be necessarily continued through
years.
Id. at 577. The reserved right to 1,000 miner's inches of water, not appropriated under
state law, was to be protected against diminishment by subsequent upstream appropria-
tors who held valid Montana water rights. Without the water, the national policy of
changing the Indians to a pastoral people would have been frustrated. Additionally, the
Court noted the rule that any ambiguity in a treaty with Indians must be resolved in their
favor.
I F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 105 (1971) (Report NWCL-
71-014 prepared under contract with the National Water Commission). Reserved water
rights were found for Indian reservations in several instances. See, e.g., United States v.
Ahtanum Irrig. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957);
United States v. Walker River Irrig. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v.
Conrad Investment Co., 156 F. 123 (D. Mont. 1907), aff 'd, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908). For
discussion of reserved waters for Indian reservations see generally E. CLYDE, INDIAN WATER
RIGHTS 377 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Bloom, Indian "Paramount" Rights to Water Use, 16
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 669 (1971).
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The claim of the states to exclusive dominion over water
rights, excluding reserved rights for Indians, was thought to have
been recognized and strengthened by the Supreme Court in
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.9 In
construing the Acts of 1866 and 187010 and the Desert Land Act
of 1877," which because of their express recognition of and defer-
ence to state-decreed water rights were the keystones of the
states' position, the Court remarked:
What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if not before, all non-
navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici
juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states ...
with the right in each to determine for itself to what extent the rule
of appropriation or the common-law rule in respect of riparian rights
should obtain.12
The optimism of the states, engendered by Beaver Portland, was
dashed two decades later in Federal Power Commission v.
Oregon. '1 There the Court made a clear distinction between
public lands, such as those involved in Beaver Portldnd, and
reserved lands such as the Indian reservation and power site re-
servation which were before the Court in Pelton Dam." The Acts
of 1866, 1870, and 1877 were held to be inapplicable to reserved
lands and waters appurtenant thereto. Thus, there appeared to
be federal rights, independent of state law, to the use of waters
appurtenant to reserved lands. 5
It was not until 1963 in Arizona v. California" that the full
scope and potential effects of the doctrine of reserved rights be-
came apparent. After a massive evidentiary proceeding, a special
295 U.S. 142 (1935). (This case is generally referred to as Beaver Portland.)
Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 218, amending Act of July 26, 1866, ch.
262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253. These Acts are now the basis of 43 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1970).
1 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-39 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, §
1, 19 Stat. 377).
1 295 U.S. at 163-64. For discussion of these Acts see C. WHEATLEY, C. CORKER, T.
STETSON & D. REED, 1 STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND USE OF WATER
RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS 153-70 (1969) (prepared under contract with Public Land
Law Review Commission). A
" 349 U.S. 435 (1955). (This case is generally referred to as Pelton Dam.)
' Public lands are those federal lands subject to disposition under the public land
laws. Reserved lands are the federal lands set aside for public purposes and are not subject
to private entry or disposition. Id. at 448.
I d.
II 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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master, appointed by the Supreme Court, concluded, inter alia,
that in addition to its power to reserve waters by implication for
Indian reservations, the United States could similarly reserve
waters for national parks, forests, monuments, recreation areas,
fish and wildlife refuges, and Bureau of Land Management
lands." However, the United States' claims were subjected to a
strict burden of proof and were found to be de minimus in most
instances. The Supreme Court expressly confirmed the extention
of the implied reservation doctrine to non-Indian reservations'8
and generally adopted the special master's report.
Western waters users have been concerned about the implied
reservation doctrine because of its "uncorrelated mystery" and
"ethereal" character,' 9 and because of the extensive public land
acreage in the West. In particular, reserved lands such as national
forests and parks are frequently the fountainheads of western
water supplies.2 " The unasserted reserved rights of such lands
cloud the character of state-decreed water rights because the ex-
istence, points of diversion (if any), places of use, priorities, and
amount of reserved rights remain largely unknown. State admin-
istration, planning, and adjudications are disrupted and frus-
trated by these uncertainties. Water resource development may
Id. at 592-94.
" For further discussion of Arizona v. California see C. WHEATLEY, supra note 12, at
121-36; Haber, Arizona v. California-A Brief Review, 4 NATURAL RES. J. 17 (1964); Mey-
ers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).
" The Colorado Supreme Court so described the doctrine in United States v. District
Court in and for the County of Eagle, 169 Colo. 555, 579-80, 458 P.2d 760, 772 (1969), af 'd,
401 U.S. 520 (1971). For a complete discussion of the doctrine of reserved water rights see
E. MORREALE, FEDERAL-STATE RIGHTS AND RELATIONS, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS (R. Clark
ed. 1967); F. TRELEASE, supra note 8; C. WHEATLEY, supra note 12; Moses, Federal-State
Water Problems, 47 DENVER L.J. 194 (1970); Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How it
Grew: Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV. L. REV.
639 (1975).
" Some 46% of the total land area in the West is public land. Approximately 88% of
the runoff from public lands in the eleven coterminous western states is derived from
national forests and about 59% of the total annual runoff in those states comes from
national forests. See PUBuc LAND LAW REvIEw COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
LAND 141 (1970); C. WHEATLEY, supra note 12, at 386.
Although the amount of water to be claimed for most reserved rights is expected to
be minimal, substantial claims may be made for Indian and oil shale reservations. Hol-
land, Mixing Oil and Water: The Effect of Prevailing Water Law Doctrines on Oil Shale
Developments, 52 DENVER L.J. 657 (1975); Note, A Proposal for the Quantification of
Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1974).
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be similarly impeded."t Owners of state water rights particularly
object to the tenet of the doctrine that no compensation is paid




Since the mid-1950's, Congress has entertained legislation to
define federal-state relations in water matters and, in particular,
to address the reserved rights doctrine. 3 None of these legislative
proposals had succeeded, however, when the jurisdictional battle
over reserved rights adjudication erupted in 1967 in Colorado.
Upon petition of the Colorado River Water Conservation Dis-
trict, the District Court in and for Eagle County, Colorado initi-
ated an adjudication of water rights in the Eagle River and its
tributaries.2 ' Notice of this proceeding was served upon the Fed-
eral Government pursuant to the requirements of the McCarran
Amendment for joining the United States.2 5 The United States
moved that it be dismissed from the action for lack of jurisdiction
based upon the Government's sovereign immunity. The motion
was denied. The United States then applied to the Colorado Su-
preme Court for a writ in the nature of prohibition on the con-
tention that its reserved water rights were not within the purview
of the McCarran Amendment's waiver of sovereign immunity
and, therefore, could not be adjudicated in state court. The state
supreme court denied the writ and declared:
" For further discussion of the problems engendered by the doctrine see F. TRELEASE,
supra note 8, at 117-30.
2 Id. at 147m.
23 For a complete discussion of these legislative proposals see Hanks, Peace West of
the 98th Meridian-A Solution to Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters, 23
RuTOEas L. REV. 33 (1968); Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters-A
Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RuraERs L. REv. 423 (1966). The Na-
tional Water Commission urged modification of the doctrine to provide for compensation
for any water users whose prior rights are impaired by exercise of reserved rights. NATIONAL
WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FutruR 467-69 (1973). See also Pumac LAND
LAw REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 20, at 146-49 (1970).
" The Colorado River Water Conservation District was established as a public agency
in 1937 by the state legislature to promote "the conservation, use and development of the
water resources of the Colorado River and its principal tributaries" and "to safeguard for
Colorado, all water to which the state of Colorado is equitably entitled under the Colorado
River Compact." COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-46-101 (1973).
2' See note 2 supra.
" COLO. R. Civ. Pxoc. 106.
VOL. 53
1976 STATE COURTS AND RESERVED WATER RIGHTS 649
For the reasons already expressed as to the promotion of orderly
procedure, we hold that it was the purpose and intent of the McCar-
ran Amendment that it be used to obtain jurisdiction over the
United States with respect to its reserved water rights."
The Supreme Court of the United States granted a petition
for a writ of certiorari in order to consider the important jurisdic-
tional question. 8 In 1971, in United States v. District Court in
and for the County of Eagle, 2' the Government's argument that
the McCarran Amendment did not submit reserved right claims
to the jurisdiction of Colorado's courts was tersely repudiated by
a unanimous Court:
We reject that conclusion for we deal with an all-inclusive statute
concerning "the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system" which in § 666(a)(1) has no exceptions and which, as we
read it, includes appropriative rights, riparian rights, and reserved
rights.3
In a companion decision, United States v. District Court in
and for Water Division No. 5,31 the Court, again unanimously,
' United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 169 Colo. 555, 581,
458 P.2d 760, 773 (1969).
397 U.S. 1005 (1970).
401 U.S. 520 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Eagle County]. Eagle County concerned
state court jurisdiction over reserved water rights pursuant to Colorado's 1943 Adjudica-
tion Act, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-9-7 (1963), which has been replaced by the Watez
Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-
101 to -602 (1973).
" 401 U.S. at 524. The Colorado Supreme Court decree was affirmed. Mr. Justice
Douglas also stated:
It is clear from our cases that the United States often has reserved water
rights based on withdrawals from the public domain. As we said in Arizona
v. California, 373 U.S. 546, the Federal Government had the authority both
before and after a State is admitted into the Union "to reserve waters for
the use and benefit of federally reserved lands." The federally reserved lands
include any federal enclave. In Arizona v. California we were primarily con-
cerned with Indian reservations. The reservation of waters may be only im-
plied and the amount will reflect the nature of the federal enclave.
Id. at 522-23 (citations omitted). Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the opinion but explic-
itly disclaimed "the intimation of any view as to the existence and scope of the so-called
'reserved water rights' of the United States." United States v. District Court in and for
Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 530 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (concurring opinion
also applied to Eagle County).
3 401 U.S. 527 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Water Division No. 51. The Colorado
Supreme Court had, without opinion, denied the United States relief in the nature of
prohibition in its efforts to defeat joinder in a state proceeding in a newly created water
division. United States v. District Court in and for Water Div. No. 5, No. 24821 (July 9,
1970).
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held that the judicial proceedings established by the Colorado
Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 19693
were sufficient to constitute a general adjudication within the
meaning of the McCarran Amendment. 33 Mr. Justice Douglas
again affirmed the Colorado Supreme Court judgment and
stated:
As we said in the Eagle County case, the words "general adjudica-
tion" were used in Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 to indicate that
43 U.S.C. § 666 does not cover consent by the United States to be
sued in a private suit to determine its rights against a few claimants.
The present suit, like the one in the Eagle County case, reaches all
claims, perhaps month by month but inclusively in the totality;
and, as we said in the other case, if there is a collision between prior
adjudicated rights and reserved rights of the United States, the
federal question can be preserved in the state decision and brought
for review."
Following these decisions, the United States submitted its claims
in Colorado Water Divisions 4, 5, and 6 pursuant to the 1969
Adjudication Act and in various district courts under the 1943
Adjudication Act.35 A master-referee was appointed to consider
the federal claims in a single proceeding and on August 6, 1976,
a Partial Master-Referee Report was submitted.
36
3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973). The 1969 Act represents a
streamlining of water adjudicatory procedures whereby a basin-wide court division con-
cept was substituted for the previous small district concept and a court-appointed referee
frees the court from many preliminary matters. See Note, A Survey of Colorado Water
Law, 47 DENVER L.J. 226, 296-304 (1970).
13 See note 2 supra.
11 401 U.S. at 529-30.
11 Water Div. No. 4, Cases W-425 through 438; Water Div. No. 5, Cases W-467
through 469; Water Div. No. 6, Cases W-85 and 86; District Court in and for Summit
County, Civil Action 2371; District Court in and for Eagle County, Civil Action 1529 and
1548; District Court in and for Grand County, Civil Action 1768.
36 Reserved water rights were found for national forests, parks and monuments, public
springs and water holes and mineral hot springs. The priority dates were antedated to
reflect the date the reservation and purpose of water use were established. For example,
no minimum stream flow rights were recognized until the June 12, 1960 enactment of the
Multiple Use Act, 16 U.S.C. § 528, which first declared fish and wildlife activities and
outdoor recreation to be national forest purposes. Additionally, reserved rights on national
forests were subordinated to state appropriations under the terms of the Organic Act of
1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473, 475-78, 479-82, 551 (1970), which grants the use of waters within
national forests for domestic, mining, milling, and irrigation purposes under state law.
The master-referee granted the Government that amount of water reasonably neces-
sary to effectuate the purposes of each reservation but held that the United States must
follow certain quantification procedures. Under the doctrine of estoppel, two parties which
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III. Akin v. United States
On November 14, 1972, less than eight months after Eagle
County and Water Division No. 5 were decided, the Federal Gov-
ernment instituted an action in federal court for the adjudication
of its claims to the use of water in the San Juan River Basin in
southwestern Colorado.37 This action was brought by the United
States in its own right and as trustee for the Ute Mountain Ute
and Southern Ute Indian tribes. The complaint sought a determi-
nation and decree of federal water rights, both appropriative and
reserved, as against 968 known defendants plus all unknown
claimants of interest to water in the Mancos, La Plata, Animas,
Florida, Los Pinos (Pine), Piedra, Navajo, and San Juan Rivers
and water tributary thereto in the state of Colorado.38 The United
States also prayed for the appointment of a water master to ad-
minister the respective rights of all users as determined in the
adjudication. Reserved water rights were asserted in connection
with the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indian
Reservations, Mesa Verde National Park, San Juan National For-
est, Yucca House and Hovenweep National Monuments, public
waterhole and spring reservations, hot spring reservations, and
certain Bureau of Reclamation Projects in the San Juan River
Basin.
The initiation of the federal action was viewed by many Colo-
rado water interests as an attempt to circumvent Colorado's
hard-fought victories in Eagle County and Water Division No. 5.
The United States Supreme Court had declared Colorado's water
courts to be experienced, competent forums for the adjudication
of federal reserved as well as appropriative rights. Did it not make
common sense to utilize the state water courts with their well-
defined procedures instead of a removed, less equipped federal
court to conduct a massive water rights adjudication? The com-
plaint's prayer for a water master to administer whatever rights
had acquired water rights and acted in reliance upon the actions of the Federal Govern-
ment were held to be protected from the detrimental assertion of reserved rights. The
Master-Referee's Partial Report is being reviewed by the water court.
United States v. Akin, Civil No. C-4497 (D. Colo., filed Nov. 14, 1972).
These waters are within the San Juan Basin and are tributary to the Colorado River
Basin. They constitute a part of Colorado's Water Division No. 7 which also includes a
substantial portion of the Dolores River Basin. CoLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 37 -92 -201(1)(g)
(1973). A map of Water Division No. 7 is produced in the appendix to this article.
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were decreed was particularly bothersome. It gave rise to fears of
confusion and conflicts between the water master and the existing
state administrative scheme.39
Despite the commencement of the federal suit, the United
States was served on December 22, 197210 under the McCarran
Amendment to join Water Division No. 7 proceedings and to
assert all of its claims to water in the Division. The Government
responded in the state action by filing its claims, both reserved
and appropriative, in the Dolores River drainage, but omitting its
claims in the San Juan River drainage which had been filed ear-
lier in federal court.
4
1
In the federal action, several defendants and intervenors"
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and upon
considerations of abstention and comity. The United States had
"' The administration and distribution of the waters within Colorado rest with the
State Engineer. The State Engineer has appointed a division engineer in each of the seven
water divisions. Numerous water commissioners on the staff of each division engineer
perform the necessary field work. Water rights are administered and distributed in accord-
ance with court decrees which set priorities by historic date of appropriation for certain
amounts of water for each right. For a further discussion of Colorado's administrative
structure and scheme see G. RADOSEVICH, K. NOSE, D. ALLARDICE, & C. KIRKWOOD, EVOLU-
TION AND ADMINISTRATION OF COLORADO WATER LAW: 1876-1976 (1976); NATIONAL WATER
COMMISSION, A SUMMARY DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAws 155-73 (1973); Carlson, Report to
Governor John A. Love on Certain Colorado Water Law Problems, 50 DENVER L.J. 293
(1973).
'* The January 3, 1973 date cited by the Court in Akin referred to the date of service
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(d)(4) upon the U.S. Attorney in Denver and
upon the Attorney General in Washington; service under the McCarran Amendment was
achieved on December 22, 1972. 424 U.S. at 806.
" On October 6, 1976, the reserved right claims in the Dolores River drainage were
rebuffed by the Colorado District Court in and for Water Division No. 7. Relying upon
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland, 295 U.S. 142 (1935), Stockman v. Leddy,
55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 222 (1912), United States v. District Court in and for the County of
Eagle, 169 Colo. 555, 458 P.2d 760 (1969), the McCarran Amendment, and the history of
Colorado's entry into the Union, the court held that in Colorado there can be no water
rights reserved, at least subsequent to the admission of Colorado to the Union in 1876. In
re Application for Water Rights of the United States of America, Cases W-1120-73 through
W-1139-73 and W-1143-73 through W-1148-73, Oct. 6, 1976 (Findings of Law of Case and
Order).
2 The Colorado River Water Conservation District, the Board of Water Commisson-
ers of the City and County of Denver, the Southwestern Water Conservation District, the
Mancos Water Conservancy District and the State of Colorado appeared in the action to
urge dismissal of the federal claims. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe, the Ute Mountain
Ute Indian Tribe and the National Tribal Chairman's Association appeared as amici
curiae through the Native American Rights Fund to urge retention of federal jurisdiction.
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invoked the jurisdiction of the district court under the following
statute:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceed-
ings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer
thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress.
43
This jurisdictional claim was contested on the ground that the
McCarran Amendment was an Act of Congress which "otherwise
provided" for specific state court jurisdiction. Once service was
completed under the Amendment, it was argued that there could
be no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 to adjudicate federal
water rights.
Even if federal court jurisdicton existed, the court was urged
to decline to exercise it under the doctrine of abstention, which
vests the court with the discretionary authority to dismiss or to
stay an action even though the court is possessed of the requisite
jurisdiction." Abstention was first announced as a doctrine in
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.45 and has been
approved by the Court on numerous occasions where the benefits
of deferring to a state court outweighed the harm of dismissing
or postponing a federal action." The defendants and intervenors
in Akin argued that under the guidelines of Burford v. Sun Oil
Co. 7 and Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Rail-
way Co." abstention was proper to avoid disruption of a state
program and state policy." Specifically, although reserved water
rights may be created independent of state law, they must be
28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1970).
" The limited circumstances in which a court may invoke the doctrine of abstention
were delineated by the Supreme Court in Akin. See note 63 infra.
. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
" For discussion of abstention cases and the abstention doctrine see, H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973); 1A MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.203, at 2101 (2d ed. 1976); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (2d
ed. 1970); Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of Judicial Power,
27 VAND. L. REv. 1107 (1974); Comment, Adjudication of Indian and Federal Water Rights
in the Federal Courts, 46 COLO. L. Rlv. 555 (1975).
S319 U.S. 315 (1943).
" 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
, In Burford, abstention was deemed appropriate to avoid federal conflict with the
Texas oil well drilling regulatory program. Railroad activity which was subject to a regula-
tory scheme under the jurisdiction of a state public service commission was the state
interest deferred to in Alabama.
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administered in a priority system with water rights established
under state law. Also, as water rights in a priority system are
interrelated by virture of their common source of supply, reserved
rights would necessarily be entwined with appropriative rights in
an administrative scheme.50 Furthermore, abstention had been
recognized as proper where the subject matter of the lawsuit was
water-a unique resource of great concern to the state."
The doctrine of comity was also advanced as a basis upon
which the federal court should decline jurisdiction. Comity refers
to a judicial policy of avoiding federal-state conflicts over matters
within the normal sphere of state activity. 52 Federal jurisdiction
was attacked as an unnecessary and substantial interference with
Colorado's water right adjudication and administrative system
and inconsistent with the longstanding congressional policy of
deferring to state law and state proceedings in water right mat-
ters.5
3
The United States argued in rebuttal that the McCarran
Amendment did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1345. The Amendment merely authorized joinder of the
Abstention has been held to be appropriate in similar circumstances. See Allegheny
Airlines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 465 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
" Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968); Union Water Supply
Corp. v. Vaughn, 355 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1973);
cf. Reetz v. Bozanick, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
52 Mr. Justice Black, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), described comity as:
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continu-
ance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways. . . . What the concept does represent is a system in which
there is sensivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States.
Id. at 44 (emphasis added). Comity is perhaps best viewed as part of the abstention
doctrine, though it alone can support a dismissal of a federal action where federal jurisdic-
tion would disrupt state interests. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 361
U.S. 185 (1959); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 465 F.2d
237 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973). See also Comment, Federal Injunc-
tions Against State Action, 35 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 744 (1967).
" See In re Green River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah 1956). See also F.
TRELEASE, supra note 8; NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE,
supra note 24, at 459-71 (1973).
VOL. 53
1976 STATE COURTS AND RESERVED WATER RIGHTS 655
United States but did not bar the Federal Government from uti-
lizing federal courts for water adjudications. The United States
asserted it had initiated suit before its joinder in the state action
and, as sovereign, should have its choice of forums. Abstention
"is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a Dis-
trict Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it,""5 and
should not be invoked to dismiss their action; the doctrine has
generally been confined to instances where a federal constitu-
tional question might be mooted or affected by an underlying
issue of state law.5 The United States claimed Akin involved no
unresolved question of state law but rather posed questions of
federal law which a federal court normally should resolve. Simi-
larly, comity was a restricted doctrine applicable only to situa-
tions involving state criminal or quasi-criminal suits and, if it was
to be applied at all in Akin, would require the state court to yield
to the federal court which had first obtained jurisdiction.
Additionally, as amici curiae Indian groups pointed out,
"[t]he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and
control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history,""5 and, since
water rights for Indian reservations were before the federal court,
deference to a state forum would be inappropriate. In fact, the
United States and the Indian groups argued that federal courts
were the exclusive forum for the adjudication of reserved waters
claimed for the Indian reservations and the state court had no
jurisdiction over such claims. The McCarran Amendment did not
expressly include Indian water rights and, in light of the long-
standing policy against state jurisdiction over Indian matters,
they urged that it not be interpreted to encompass Indian re-
served rights. Support for this exclusion from the Amendment
was claimed to be found in Public Law 280 which, inter alia,
contains limitations on state civil jurisdiction over Indian lands
and water rights.57
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959).
Id. at 189; Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
5' Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945). See also McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
1' Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, tit. XVIII, 67 Stat. 588 (partially codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970), as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1970)). This
Act, commonly known as Public Law 280, provides, after granting civil jurisdiction over
Indian matters to five states, that nothing in the statute
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The federal district court decided to abstain in recognition
of the presence of applicable and workable state law and the state
proceeding. 51 In adopting a practical approach, the court cited a
desire to avoid a duplicative and piecemeal adjudication and
administration. The state forum was declared to be able to fully
and adequately adjudicate all issues including those concerning
the Indian reservations.
The United States prosecuted an appeal to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals which reversed the order of dismissal .5  The
court concentrated upon the effect of the McCarran Amendment
upon federal court jurisdiction. The district court had avoided
that issue by its determination to abstain from exercising any
jurisdiction it may have had. The circuit court held that the
McCarran Amendment leaves federal jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1345 unimpaired and that the Amendment "does not
express an intention that the United States shall utilize state
courts for the purpose of litigating its claims to water."60
After finding federal jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit turned
to the abstention question. In abrupt fashion, the court concluded
that the case before it did not fit within any of the extremely
narrow areas in which abstention was proper. The Federal Gov-
shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or per-
sonal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian
tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or
shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsis-
tent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation
made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudi-
cate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to posses-
sion of such property or any interest therein.
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970) (emphasis added). Colorado is not one of the five states enumer-
ated in P.L. 280 and has not acted to assume P.L. 280 jurisdiction. Courts have recognized
Colorado's jurisdiction in certain matters involving Indians, their property and reserva-
tions. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe,
150 Colo. 504, 374 P.2d 691 (1962). See also Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915
(10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958). But see Whyte v. District Court, 140
Colo. 344, 346 P.2d 1012 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1960). See generally THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS' CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG. IsT Sass., BACKGROUND REPORT ON PUBLIC LAw
280 (COMM. PRINT 1975).
I" Civil No. 4497 (D. Colo., July 30, 1973). The district court issued no written opin-
ion.
, United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 118.
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ernment had won the race to the courthouse and the presence of
the United States as plaintiff seeking to establish national rights
militated strongly against the invocation of abstention. There-
fore, the court of appeals directed the district court to proceed
with the adjudication."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider the important questions of whether the McCarran
amendment terminated jurisdicition of federal courts to adjudicate
federal water rights and whether, if that jurisdiction was not termi-
nated, the District Court's dismissal in this case was nevertheless
appropriate."2
On March 24, 1976, the Court reversed the court of appeals and
reinstated the district court's dismissal of the action. However,
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for six members of the Court, re-
jected the district court's reliance on the doctrine of abstention
as the basis for declining federal jurisdicton.13 Deference to the
state forum was held proper because "in situations involving the
contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions,"" excep-
tional circumstances like those present in Akin can warrant dis-
missal of a federal complaint. Thus, the Court reaffirmed Colo-
rado's position that federal reserved rights should be adjudicated
in state court.
Although the petitioners did not raise the issue, the Court
first considered whether the McCarran Amendment repealed the
" For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit opinion see, Note, Water Law: A Repudiation
of Abstention, 53 DEWER L.J. 225 (1976); Note, Water Law-Procedural Inconsistencies
and Substantive Issues in the Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine, 10 LAND & WATER
L. Rsv. 477 (1975); Comment, Adjudication of Indian and Federal Water Rights in the
Federal Courts, 46 CoLo. L. RVv. 555 (1975).
"2 424 U.S. at 806. The order granting certiorari to the two petitions appears at 421
U.S. 946 (1975). The petitions were supported by a joint brief from the States of Arizona,
California, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
U Abstention was declared to be appropriate in only three general categories: First,
where a federal constitutional issue might be mooted or presented in a different posture
by a state court determination of a pertinent state law issue; second, where there are
difficult questions of state law "bearing on policy problems of substantial public import
whose importance transcends the result in the case at bar" and federal jurisdiction would
be disruptive of state policy efforts; and third, where federal jurisdiction has been invoked
to restrain state criminal, quasi-criminal nuisance, or tax collection proceedings. The
Court held that Akin did not fall within any of these categories. 424 U.S. at 817.
" Id.
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jurisdiction of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1345.1 Upon
review of the language and legislative history of the Amendment
and citing the rule disfavoring an implied repeal, it was con-
cluded that the McCarran Amendment did not bar federal dis-
trict court jurisdiction under § 1345 and the district court had
jurisdiction to hear the case.16
The Court held, however, that the McCarran Amendment
grants the right to join the United States in a state proceeding to
determine reserved rights held on behalf of Indians. The Amend-
ment's language, legislative history and fundamental purpose
were held to command an all-inclusive construction. The Court
failed to find any support for the argument that Indian reserved
rights were substantially different from other reserved rights.67
Further, the Court rejected the notion that state court jurisdic-
tion was inimical to Indian interests.
68
Even though abstention principles were inapposite, deferral
to the state proceeding was justified on consideration of "[w]ise
judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation."69 As an
example of wise judicial administration, Mr. Justice Brennan
cited the rule that courts generally yield to the first court which
assumes jurisdiction over property. 0
"' See text accompanying note 43 supra.
" 424 U.S. at 809.
17 It has been argued that Indians themselves reserved water rights which they al-
ready owned prior to any land reservations established by the United States. Under this
reasoning, Indian water rights are paramount rights and their priority could pre-date the
land reservation. See Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights for the Use of Water,
16 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INsT. 631 (1971). However, the Court held in Akin that the
reserved water rights of Indian reservations are owned by the United States just like those
of national parks and forests. 424 U.S. at 810.
" "Mere subjection of Indian rights to legal challenge in state court, however, would
no more imperil those rights than would a suit brought by the Government in district court
. " Id. at 812.
The Court also noted that P.L. 83-280, 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1970) and 28 U.S.C. §
1360(b) (1970) does not limit the special consent to jurisdiction of the McCarran Amend-
ment. Id. at 812-13 n.20.
A Motion for Leave to File Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing by amici
curiae Indian groups urged reconsideration of the dismissal of the claims asserted on
behalf of the Indian reservation. The motion was denied. 96 S. Ct. 2239 (1976).
" 424 U.S. at 817, quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S.
180, 183 (1952) and citing Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
70 This rule was not applied but its underlying rationale of avoiding piecemeal litiga-
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In Akin there were several factors which permitted dismissal
of the federal suit under this pragmatic principle. The policy
evinced by the McCarran Amendment itself speaks against piece-
meal or concurrent adjudication of water rights in a river system.
Water rights are best determined in unified proceedings such as
those available under Colorado's comprehensive state system.
Additionally, the Court found the following factors to be signifi-
cant: First, the absence of any substantial federal court proceed-
ings prior to the joinder of the United States in the Water Divi-
sion No. 7 adjudication; second, the extensive involvement of
state decreed water rights; third, the 300 mile distance from the
state court in Water Division No. 7 to the federal court in Denver;
fourth, the Government's adjudication of reserved rights in Colo-
rado's water courts pursuant to Eagle County and Water Division
No. 5.7I Thus, in order to promote the wise use of judicial re-
sources, the jurisdiction of the federal district court was required
to yield to that of the state water court.
72
Akin provides an avenue by which Colorado can deal with
the troublesome reserved rights doctrine in a familiar and con-
venient forum. Acting pursuant to the McCarran Amendment,
Colorado interests can require the United States to present all of
its water claims, including those for Indian reservations, in the
state's water courts. Thus, the "uncorrelated mystery" 7 of re-
served rights can be dispelled.
The advantages of a water right adjudication in state rather
than federal court could be substantial. The Idaho Supreme
Court has held that under the McCarran Amendment, the United
States is bound by Idaho state law at least to the extent of requir-
tion and inconsistent disposition of property was cited in support of the federal dismissal.
Id. at 819. Petitioners argued to the Court that under the holding in Pacific Live Stock
Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440 (1916), the rule is confined to instances where the suits are
virtually identical. Here, it was urged that the state court had on-going jurisdiction over
the waters in Water Division No. 7 and would conduct an all-inclusive adjudication in
contrast to the limited proceeding in federal court. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 11.
11 424 U.S. at 820. It should be noted that prior to its joinder in the state action the
United States had only filed its complaint and completed service on a few defendant state
agencies. Except for the motions to intervene and to dismiss, there had been little substan-
tive activity in the federal suit.
12 Two dissenting opinions rejected the majority view and found that there was no
justification at all for dismissal of the federal action. Id. at 821-27.
" See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
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ing quantification of reserved rights in a general adjudication.7 '
Similarly, each state forum will be able to conduct an integration
of reserved rights into its water rights system in the manner it
views to be most consistent with state law. Of course, should any
state adjudication be improperly antagonistic to the federal
claims, the United States Supreme Court has stated that all
questions concerning the adjudication of reserved rights, includ-
ing the volume and scope of particular rights, may be reviewed
after final judgment in the state court.7"
Despite the Supreme Court's emphatic holdings in the Colo-
rado trilogy of Eagle County, Water Division No. 5, and Akin,
other Western States may face resistance in attempting to join
the United States under the McCarran Amendment. The doc-
trine of prior appropriation is the bedrock of the Western States'
water law systems. However, divergent economic and political
policies and the particularities of the water situation in each state
have led to the enactment of differing adjudicatory and adminis-
trative systems. Many of these systems are now primarily admin-
istrative in constrast to Colorado's judicial adjudicatory scheme.76
Since the McCarran Amendment's waiver of sovereign immunity
has been limited to proceedings in the nature of a general adjudi-
cation,77 the United States may attempt to defeat joinder in an
action which differs from the historic concept of a judicial pro-
ceeding in which there is a complete ascertainment of all rights
in a water source.78 However, the Colorado trilogy demonstrates
that the McCarran Amendment must be construed in a practical
manner to effectuate the intent of Congress to allow the determi-
nation of all federal water claims in a state forum. The efforts of
the United States to narrowly construe the concept of a general
adjudication were totally rebuffed in Eagle County and Water
Division No. 5. Akin provides further ammunition for state inter-
" Avondale Irrig. Dist. v. North Idaho Properties, Inc., 96 Idaho 1, 523 P.2d 818
(1974). The United States did not seek review to the United States Supreme Court.
" United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 525-
26 (1971); United States v. District Court in and for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529-
30 (1971).
76 See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 39.
" See United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520
(1971); United States v. District Court in and for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971);
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
"' See Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 447-48 (1916).
VOL. 53
1976 STATE COURTS AND RESERVED WATER RIGHTS 661
ests by adding considerations of "the conservation of judicial re-
sources and comprehensive disposition of litigation"7" to any bat-
tle between state and federal forums. This latest pronouncement
should be of significant assistance to other states who wish to join
the United States in a state proceeding.
CONCLUSION
Akin is a milestone in the turbulent history of federal reserved
rights adjudication. In Colorado, Akin concludes a trilogy of
fiercely contested jurisdictional battles between the Federal Gov-
ernment and state water interests. All water rights, including
federal reserved rights and Indian claims, will be determined in
state court under state procedures and will be administered under
the state system. Hopefully, this marks the final attempt by the
United States to circumvent the common sense policy of the
McCarran Amendment allowing all federal water rights claims to
be litigated in state courts. Other Western States should find
support in Akin for joining the United States under the McCarran
Amendment to allow determination of reserved rights in their
local forums.
In a broader context, Akin represents a laudatory step in the
allocation of judicial power between the federal and state sys-
tems. Abstention, with its rather inflexible criteria, is no longer
the only doctrine under which federal courts may decline to deter-
mine a controversy within its jurisdiction. Quite remarkably, the
Court has declared that "the virtually unflagging obligation of
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them" 0 may be
waived where there are dominant practical considerations for uti-
lizing a state forum. While the caution of the Court indicates that
the standard for dismissing a complaint from federal court on
considerations of judicial administration will not be easily met,
Akin welcomes attention to practical concerns when a federal
court is confronted with a federal-state jurisdictional conflict.
The Court's pragmatic focus enhances the legitimate role of state
courts in our dual judicial scheme.
1, 424 U.S. at 817, quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S.
180, 183 (1952) and citing Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
" 424 U.S. at 817.
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